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All industries are characterized by the simultaneous presence of ﬁrms with diﬀerent levels
of eﬃciency. More productive ﬁrms are larger in terms of output as well as sales and
this maps into larger proﬁts. Less productive ﬁrms are smaller and less proﬁtable. More
productive ﬁrms are also able to sell to more distant markets whereas less productive
ones are conﬁned to their local markets.
In this respect, a hallmark result goes under the label of “exceptional export perfor-
mance” (Bernard and Jensen, 1999), which refers to the fact that exporters are system-
atically found to be on average more productive than purely local ﬁrms. In principle
causality could run both ways: only more productive ﬁrms become exporters (‘selection
into export status’) and exporting improves ﬁrm eﬃciency (‘learning by exporting’). The
current consensus view favors the former direction of causality. In particular, two styl-
ized facts are often stressed. First, exposure to trade forces the least productive ﬁrms
to exit the market or to shut down (Clerides et al., 1998; Bernard and Jensen, 1999; Aw
et al., 2003). Second, trade liberalization leads to market share reallocations towards
more productive ﬁrms (Pavcnik, 2002; Bernard et al., 2006). Thus, there seems to be
some robust evidence that the opening of distant markets gives an additional opportu-
nity only to more productive ﬁrms. This allows them to enlarge their markets shares to
the detriment of less productive competitors, the least eﬃcient of which are forced to
exit.
These empirical results have been recently explained by theoretical models in which
heterogeneous ﬁrms act in imperfectly competitive markets, perfect competition being
incompatible with the equilibrium coexistence of ﬁrms with diﬀerent eﬃciency levels.
Existing models diﬀer in terms of the feature that leads only the most productive ﬁrms
to engage in distant trade. For example, Bernard et al. (2003) stress the role of limited
product diﬀerentiation resulting in tougher worldwide price competition when markets
become more open. Melitz (2003) builds instead on the role played by the sunk cost
of exporting documented by Roberts and Tybout (1997) as well as Bernard and Jensen
(1999). In the presence of these costs only more productive ﬁrms can aﬀord the commer-
cial opportunities of distant trade. When markups are ﬁxed, this allows them to grow in
size bidding up factor prices, which crowds out their less productive competitors. Melitz
and Ottaviano (2005) show that a similar eﬀect can derive from falling markups when
these are allowed to react to increasing openness. Their model is extended and calibrated
by Del Gatto et al. (2006) in the case of a multi-location multi-sector economy where
the intensity of ﬁrm selection due to distant trade is shown to vary across locations
depending on their sectoral specialization and their geographical position in the trade
network.
All these models yield empirical predictions concerning the eﬀects of trade openness
1We thank participants to seminars at the Bank of Italy and the University of Cagliari as well as
participants to the conference “Empirical methods for the study of economic agglomeration” at Ky-
oto University for helpful comments. We are especially indebted with Eckhardt Bode, Pierre-Philippe
Combes, Gilles Duranton, Thierry Mayer, Tomoya Mori, Henry Overman, David Weinstein and anony-
mous referees for useful comments. Ottaviano gratefully acknowledges ﬁnancial support from MIUR
and the European Commission. The opinions expressed do not necessarily reﬂect those of the Bank of
Italy.
3on the distribution of ﬁrms across productivity or cost levels.2 In particular, much
attention has been devoted to the mean value of such distribution. For example, all
models predict an increase in average industry productivity or a reduction in average
industry cost as the market becomes more open to distant sellers and less productive
ﬁrms are forced to shut down. In Del Gatto et al. (2006) the average industry cost
is lower in locations that have larger local markets, better access to distant markets
and a bias towards industries with weaker product diﬀerentiation. On the other hand,
less attention has been devoted to the dispersion (or spread) of the distribution. For
example, the exit of the least productive ﬁrms should naturally lead to a reduction
in the industry productivity or cost ranges, deﬁned as the gaps between the best and
the worst performing ﬁrms (or plants) in the industry. Accordingly, in a time-series
perspective, increasing trade openness should be associated with falling productivity or
cost ranges. In a cross-section perspective, smaller ranges should characterize larger
and more accessible markets or sectors that are more open to distant trade and deal in
less diﬀerentiated products. None of these implications for productivity or cost spreads
have been explicitly tested so far. The only notable exception is Syverson (2004) who
investigates the relation between productivity spreads and tradability as a robustness
check within his analysis of the links between those spreads and product substitutability.
His regressions, based on a cross-section of US ﬁrms, do not provide any support to the
statistical signiﬁcance of such relation.
The aim of this paper is to start ﬁlling the gap in the literature by investigating the
theoretical implications of trade openness on industry cost dispersion. Speciﬁcally, we
check whether intra-industry cost spreads are smaller in more export-oriented industries.
This may have important implications for the political economy of trade liberalization.
When ﬁrm heterogeneity is not taken into account, traditional trade models show that all
ﬁrms equally lose from trade liberalization to the advantage of consumers. All ﬁrms have
therefore the same incentive to participate to protectionist lobbying. Recent models with
ﬁrm heterogeneity show instead that, within the very same sector, the incentive to lobby
varies across ﬁrms with diﬀerent market performance, which translates into political
economy outcomes that depend on the dispersion of such performance (Bombardini,
2005). Accordingly, ﬁrm heterogeneity aﬀects the clout of protectionist stances and
their translation into eﬀective pressure on policy makers.3 Whether trade openness
increases or decreases the diﬀerences between ﬁrms then becomes crucial for the political
sustainability of ongoing trade liberalization.
Our empirical analysis is implemented on a panel of Italian ﬁrms drawn from the Com-
pany Accounts Data Service (‘Centrale dei Bilanci’), which reports the balance sheets of
around 30.000 ﬁrms from 1983 to 1999. From a methodological point of view, we show
that, when bringing the existing theoretical models with ﬁrm heterogeneity to data, it
is crucial to consistently account for the implications of their imperfectly competitive
2This literature typically studies the eﬀects of trade openness on Hicks-neutral technological change.
While this remains also our focus, the potential impact of trade openness on relative factor intensity is
an interesting topic for future research.
3Bombardini (2005) shows that accounting for ﬁrm size dispersion and associated diﬀerences in lobby
participation shares explains a non-negligible fraction of the variation of protection across US sectors.
Our theoretical framework does not model this political economy channel. Nevertheless, we will have to
take it into account when we discuss the estimated correlation between trade openness and dispersion
of ﬁrm performance in terms of underlying causal relations.
4market structure, especially when it comes to measuring ﬁrm-level productivity. In so
doing, we depart from the standard approach that estimates the total factor productivity
(TFP) of a ﬁrm as the Solow residual of a ﬁrm-level regression under the assumption
of perfectly competitive product markets. This assumption, which contradicts all theo-
retical models, has little bearing when the focus of the empirical analysis is on average
industry productivity as usual. It is not innocuous when the focus is, instead, on the
productivity spread. To solve this problem, we implement a new estimation procedure
that takes imperfect competition into account in the wake of Melitz (2000). This way
we ﬁnd that industries that are more export-oriented or exhibit lower transport costs
generally exhibit smaller cost dispersion. To the best of our knowledge, we are the ﬁrst
to provide a systematic analysis of the relation between the degree of trade openness and
the second moment of the distribution of ﬁrm eﬃciency for a European country.
The paper is organized in six sections after the introduction. Section 2 presents
the theoretical framework. Section 3 uses the framework to illustrate the implications
of imperfect competition for productivity estimation and implements a procedure that
takes those implications into account. Section 4 describes the dataset. Section 5 presents
a benchmark speciﬁcation closely derived from the theoretical framework and reports the
corresponding results. Section 6 discusses several robustness checks. Section 7 concludes.
2 Theoretical model
The theoretical framework is based on the model by Melitz (2003) and its extension
by Falvey, Greenaway and Yu (2004). Consider an industry operating in two locations,
home and foreign, that are identical in all exogenous attributes except market sizes.
For parsimony, in the description of the model we focus on the home location with the
understanding that analoguous conditions hold for the foreign one.
The industry is monopolistic competitive and each producer supplies a variety of a
horizontally diﬀerentiated good using capital and labor as inputs. There is an inﬁnite
number of ex-ante identical potential entrants. In both countries each entrant faces the
same sunk entry cost rαwβfE, where r and w are the (exogenously given) rental rate of
capital and the wage of labor with complementary shares α + β = 1. This cost can be
thought of as an irreversible R&D investment whereby the entrant creates a new product
and the corresponding production process. The outcome of R&D is uncertain in that
the entrant gets to know the costs of its new production process only after entry has
taken place and the corresponding cost has been sunk. All potential entrants make their
decisions to enter or not simultaneously. Accordingly, after sinking their entry costs,
all entrants are able to calculate the proﬁts they would earn if they decided to stay
in the market and start producing. This would require them to pay additional ﬁxed
costs of production rαwβfD for domestic sales and rαwβfX for distant sales (‘exports’)
with fX > fD as distant activities typically involve more complex operations. Distant
sales also involve per-unit trade costs of the iceberg type: for one unit to reach distant
customers τ > 1 units have to be shipped.
All the foregoing costs are the same for all entrants in both countries and known
before entry. The marginal cost is, instead, unknown before entry and thus may end
up being diﬀerent across entrants. Speciﬁcally, let Ci be a random variable with c.d.f.
G(Ci) over the support [0,CM]. Then, the marginal cost is also a random variable and
5is assumed to be given by:
MCi = rαwβCi (1)
where Ci is the marginal resource cost (henceforth, ‘real marginal cost’ or RMC), which
drives ﬁrm heterogeneity and is the inverse of TFP. As entrants become eventually diﬀer-
ent only after drawing their RMC’s, it is convenient to identify them by the corresponding
RMC draws. Hence, we call i the entrant that draws a RMC realization equal to Ci.
Accordingly, (1) is the marginal cost of entrant i.
In each location ﬁrms face the same downward sloping demands with constant own-
and cross-price elasticities. In particular, using an asterisk to label foreign variables,










in its domestic and distant markets respectively. In (2), σ > 1 is the constant own- and
cross-price elasticity of demand, Pi and e Pi are the delivered prices in the domestic and
foreign markets, E is industry expenditures as well as revenues, and P is the industry














where I is the set of domestic producers while IX is the set of foreign exporters.



















in the domestic and distant markets respectively with B ≡ EPσ−1[(σ − 1)/σ]σ−1/σ.
Then, only entrants with RMC weakly below the cutoﬀs CD and CX, such that π(CD) =
0 and π(CX) = 0, are able to serve respectively only the local market and also the
distant market without making losses. Other entrants do not produce and exit. Given
























This shows that larger ﬁxed and per-unit trade costs increase the gap between the do-
mestic and export RMC thresholds.
6All this being anticipated by prospective entrants, free entry implies that the expected






e π(Ci)dG(Ci) = fErαwβ (7)
After substituting (4) and (5), expressions (6) and (7) together with their analogues for
the foreign location deﬁne a system of four equations in the four unknown cutoﬀs.
All results so far have been derived for a generic distribution of RMC draws. To
bring the theoretical model to data, however, we need to make some speciﬁc assumption
on the functional form of such distribution. In particular, we assume that entrants draw
their RMC’s from a Pareto distribution. In so doing, we build on Del Gatto et al. (2006)
who ﬁnd that a Pareto c.d.f. provides a fairly accurate description of actual data across
many industries in EU countries. While this is our working assumption, in the empirical
analysis we will test its validity and also investigate a more general speciﬁcation where
such assumption is removed.4 Formally, let us assume that entrants draw their RMC’s






for Ci ∈ [0,CM] (8)
where k ≥ 1 measures the skewness of the RMC distribution towards the upper bound
of its support. Then, under the regularity condition k > σ − 1, the domestic cutoﬀ is








where Λ = k/(σ − 1) > 1 and Ω = 1 + τ−k (fX/fD)
−(Λ−1) is a synthetic measure of
trade openness (Baldwin, 2005). This index summarizes the inﬂuence of variable and
ﬁxed trade costs as mediated by the degree of product substitutability σ and the shape
parameter k of the Pareto distribution. According to (9), freer trade (smaller τ or smaller
fX) is associated with a smaller domestic cutoﬀ CD and, by (6), with a larger export
cutoﬀ CX. Under the Pareto assumption, that maps into a lower (unweighted) mean





The mean, however, is not a good measure of central rendency in skewed distributions
like the Pareto for k > 1. For such distributions a better measure is the median, which




Both (10) and (11) reveal the essence of the ‘selection eﬀect’ highlighted by Melitz
(2003): more openness to trade translates into tougher competition in factor markets,
4The assumption that RMC’s are drawn from a Pareto distribution is very convenient in theoretical
models when it comes to deriving closed form solutions. Which properties of those solutions also hold
for general classes of distributions is an important direction of future research. See, e.g., Combes at al
(2007).
7which leads to a lower domestic cutoﬀ. Firms with RMC above this level are forced to
leave the market and their shares are reallocated towards more eﬃcient ﬁrms. Hence we
have:
Result 1. Lower trade costs are associated with a lower central tendency of marginal
costs.
Turning to cost dispersion, its simplest measure is the ‘range’, deﬁned as the RMC
gap between the best and the worst performing ﬁrms. Given the support [0,CD], the
range is simply equal to CD, so it is smaller when trade is freer. While easily understood,
being based on the two boundary values only, the range is necessarily very sensitive to
extreme observations and should be used together with other measures. The most widely
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CD (12)
which is an increasing function of the cutoﬀ CD and thus also smaller when trade is
freer. The standard deviation, however, is not a good measure of dispersion in skewed
distributions, for which a better measure is the ‘interquartile range’ deﬁned as the dif-











Also this measure is increasing in the cutoﬀ CD, thus showing that dispersion is lower
when openness is larger. We can therefore conclude with:
Result 2. Lower trade costs are associated with a smaller dispersion of marginal
costs.
Due to the general skewness of the Pareto distribution, in the empirical analysis
we will choose the IQ Range as our preferred dispersion measure and the median as our
preferred central tendency measure while investigating alternative measures as robustness
checks.5
3 Productivity estimation
To calculate the individual RMC’s we rely on the production function associated with
the marginal cost (1):
Yi = Ai (Ki)
α (Li)
β (14)
5Results 1 and 2 have been derived under the assumption that RMC’s are drawn from a Pareto
distribution. The underlying logic, however, applies to a larger class of distributions. In Sections 5 we
will therefore use a measure of the IQ range that is not based on the Pareto assumption. Moreover,
in Sections 6.2 and 6.3 we will test alternative dispersion measures as well as a more general empirical
speciﬁcation of the relation between trade openness and cost dispersion.
8Ki and Li are capital and labor inputs respectively while Ai is TFP such that Ai = 1/Ci.
Hence, RMC’s can be retrieved from data by inverting the corresponding estimated
TFP’s.
The most common approach to (individual) TFP estimation expresses (14) in logs
(in lowercase letters) and includes a multiplicative stochastic disturbance (euit):
yit = ait + xitθ + uit (15)
In equation (15) ait is individual productivity, xit is the vector of inputs, θ is the vector
of the elasticities of output with respect to each input and uit is meant to capture
measurement errors as well as unobserved ﬁrm-speciﬁc shocks. The value of ait can then
be recovered by estimating the vector ˆ θ, computing the ﬁtted value of ﬁrm i’s output
ˆ yit and deriving ˆ ait as the (exponential of the) diﬀerence between yit and ˆ yit (‘Solow
residual’). However, a word of caution on the estimation procedure is in order.6
3.1 Omitted price bias and transmission bias
Standard OLS estimation of (15) could run in two diﬀerent problems. The ﬁrst problem
is often referred to as ‘simultaneity’ and stems from the fact that ait is ‘unobservable’ to
the econometrician but it is reasonably observed by the ﬁrm and likely to inﬂuence its
input choice. This relegates ait to the error term of (15), which is therefore correlated
with the vector of inputs xit biasing the OLS estimates. In econometric parlance, ait is
said to ‘transmit’ to the explanatory variables, hence the term ‘transmission bias’. The
second problem originates from the unavailability of information on ﬁrms’ output yit in
our dataset. This forces us to use a proxy consisting of sales deﬂated by an industry-wide
price-index, given that prices are themselves not available at ﬁrm level. Such circum-
stance has no relevance under perfect competition as all ﬁrms quote the same price. On
the contrary, when markets are imperfectly competitive, ﬁrm-level estimated productiv-
ity is likely to be misstated. This, of course, applies to our monopolistic competition
model, in which, as highlighted by equation (3), diﬀerences in productivity entirely trans-
late into diﬀerences in prices as these are determined by markups over marginal costs.
Since the problem is caused by omitting the individual price from the estimation, this
problem is usually referred to as ‘omitted price bias’.
The two problems can be summarized following Klette and Griliches (1996) in rewrit-
ing the estimating version of equation (15) as follows:





it and, due to constrained data availability, physical output has been
replaced by deﬂated sales ˜ rit = rit − pt = yit + qit, with rit indicating ﬁrm revenues
and qit = pit − pt measuring the diﬀerence between (the log of) the ﬁrm speciﬁc price
pit and (the log of) the deﬂator pt. Given M observations, in matrix notation the OLS
estimator of θr is:
ˆ θr = (X0X)
−1 X0e r (17)
6The estimation of production functions raises additional issues that go beyond the scope of the
present paper. Among others, it is worthwhile mentioning functional form speciﬁcation and input
heretogeneity, which may be particularly relevant in the case of labor.
9where e r is the vector of deﬂated sales and X is the matrix of factor inputs. Since
˜ rit = yit + qit, the probability limit of ˆ θr is











where q is the vector of the diﬀerences between individual prices and the industry deﬂator,
a is the vector of individual productivities in (15), and we assume orthogonality in the
error term er
it. On the right hand side, the second and third terms are the omitted price
and the transmission biases. They can be seen respectively as the OLS estimators of ω
and ε in the auxiliary regressions q = Xω + uq and a = Xε + ua, where uq and ua are
orthogonal error terms. Accordingly, we can write:
plimN→∞(ˆ θr) = θ + ω + ε (19)
so that in the limit estimated TFP evaluates to
plimN→∞(b ait) = e rit − xit plimN→∞(ˆ θr) = ait − xitω − xitε (20)
where xitω and xitε are the associated omitted price and transmission biases.
3.2 Dealing with the biases
We deal with the two types of bias as follows. We start with removing the transmission
bias following the procedure suggested by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) in the absence of
the omitted price bias (henceforth LP). In loose terms, the transmission bias originates
from the facts that the productivity shock a is observed by the ﬁrm but unobserved
by the econometrician so that ε cannot be directly estimated. The solution consists
in ﬁnding an observable proxy variable that ‘reacts’ to variations in a. Provided that
the relationship between such proxy and the productivity shock can be inverted, its
inversion can be used to ‘internalize’ the transmission bias and to identify the production
coeﬃcients consistently.7 This approach, ﬁrst proposed by Olley and Pakes (1996) using
investment as a proxy, has been amended by Levinshon and Petrin (2003) who use
instead intermediates and show that these can be introduced as additional inputs in the
production function (15) to remove the transmission bias (i.e. ε = 0).8 Under perfect
competition, the LP estimator ˆ θLP is consistent as pit = pt implies ω = 0 so that
plimN→∞(ˆ θ) = θ and plimN→∞ˆ aLP
it = ait.
Whenever pit 6= pt, the OLS estimator is, however, aﬀected by the omitted price
bias (ω 6= 0). To solve this problem, we reinterpret the approach to the ‘inconsistency
of common scale estimators’ suggested by Klette and Griliches (1996). In so doing, we
7The invertibility condition simply requires intermediate input use to be increasing in TFP conditional
on capital. Melitz (2000) shows that, under monopolistic competition, such a monotonicity condition
holds whenever more productive ﬁrms do not set disproportionately higher markups than less productive
ﬁrms. Formally, this requires the elasticity of the markup with respect to productivity to be bounded
above by (σ − 1)/σ.
8The LP procedure involves two stages. If invertible, the intermediates demand function mit =
m(ait,·) is used to generate the proxy ait = g(mit,·). In the ﬁrst stage, this is substituted in the
production function in order to identify the labor parameter getting rid of the correlation between the
regressors and the error term. In the second stage, the estimated value of the labor parameter is then
used to recover the values of the other parameters.
10follow Melitz (2000) who builds on that approach to derive the conditions under which
the LP method still yields consistent estimates under monopolistic competition. We call
LPM the resulting procedure.
Using (2) and (15), the ratio of the ﬁrm price to the industry deﬂator can be expressed
as






(xitθ + ait). (21)
where e rt = [(rt − pt) − nt] denotes average deﬂated sales. Equation (21) identiﬁes the
sources of the omitted price bias in our monopolistic competition framework and we can
















(ait + eit) (22)
Consistent estimates of θ and σ can now be obtained by applying the LP procedure to
(22). If we call them ˆ θLPM and ˆ σLPM respectively, the LPM estimated productivity can
be written as
ˆ aLPM
it = −xitˆ θLPM +
1
ˆ σLPM − 1

e rt − ˆ σLPM˜ rit

. (23)
Since the diﬀerence qit between the individual price and the industry deﬂator is now
correctly identiﬁed, the estimated productivity in (23) measures the ‘true’ productivity
(i.e. ˆ aLPM
it = ait). We can, therefore, calculate the RMC of ﬁrm i as b Ci = exp(−ˆ aLPM
it ).
Three comments are in order. First, with respect to the standard LP procedure
assuming perfect competition, consistent estimation under monopolistic competition re-
quires average deﬂated sales e rt to appear as an additional regressor in the ﬁrst stage.
Second, the fact that regression (22) consistently estimates the elasticity of substitution
σ is of interest in itself as it provides a new way of computing the extent of product
diﬀerentiation across sectors. Third, to isolate the omitted price bias, note that ne-
glecting price dispersion qit in the LP regression would imply estimated productivity
ˆ aLP
it = ˜ rit − xitˆ θLP = ˆ aLPM
it − xitω. Hence, we would have:
ˆ aLP
it = ait −
1
2(ˆ σLPM − 1)
(rit − ¯ rt) (24)
where ¯ rt = rt − nt stands for average non-deﬂated sales and we have used the fact that
ˆ aLPM
it = ait and xit(ˆ θLPM − ˆ θLP) = xitω by (19). Hence, the ‘correction factor’ to be
applied to the standard LP estimate ˆ aLP
it is an increasing function of a ﬁrm’s sales relative
to the industry average, being positive for above average ﬁrms and negative for below
average ones. In other words, disregarding price dispersion results in understating the
productivity of ﬁrms that are more productive (and therefore larger) than the average and
overstating the productivity of ﬁrms that are less productive (and therefore smaller) than
the average.9 Moreover, the magnitude of the bias depends on the estimated elasticity of
9This is consistent with the evidence recently reported by Foster et al. (2005), who have the rare
chance of comparing for several industries the estimated productivity outcomes resulting from either
ﬁrm output or ﬁrm deﬂated sales. Although they ﬁnd that the two measures are highly correlated, they
nonetheless show that quantity-based productivity measures exhibit greater dispersion than revenue-
based ones.
11substitution ˆ σLPM: the lower the elasticity of substitution (i.e. the more diﬀerentiated
the products), the larger the bias. Finally, the bias vanishes on average, so the estimated
average productivity is unaﬀected by the correction. The same, however, does not apply
to the dispersion measures.
4 Data description
Our data are drawn from ‘Centrale dei Bilanci’ (Company Accounts Data Service, hence-
forth CADS), which reports the balance sheets of around 30.000 Italian ﬁrms for the time
span 1983-1999.10 It is worth noting that, due to the speciﬁc focus of the archive, the
sample is relatively skewed towards larger ﬁrms and business units located in northern
Italy.11 Balance sheet data encompass value added, the value of intermediate goods
and services, the capital stock at book value and the number of employees. Further
information refers to the location of ﬁrms down to the municipality level. The sectoral
classiﬁcation we adopt, which includes 18 sectors, is very similar to the two-digit Nace
Rev.1 disaggregation and tries to achieve a good compromise between the need of homo-
geneity within a given sector and the need of a suﬃcient number of observations for a
statistically reliable analysis. Not all the ﬁrms belonging to the CADS sample report the
same balance sheet information. Speciﬁcally, only a subset of them reports the full set of
balance sheet items that are used to estimate capital stocks as described in Section 5.2.
Thus, we are forced to restrict the analysis to this group of ﬁrms with a consequent fall
in the number of business units, especially small units, included in our sample. Tables
4 and 5 show the coverage in 1991 and 1996, obtained by comparing the CADS sample
with the universe of Italian ﬁrms reported by the Italian NIS (i.e. ISTAT). As evident,
our sample bias is much lower with respect to ﬁrms with more than 20 workers. This
disadvantage is partially compensated by a better and more reliable quality of balance
sheet information reported. We have excluded ﬁrms in the ﬁrst and the last percentile
in terms of factor shares and capital-to-labour ratio. We have also purged the sample of
ﬁrms with intermittent participation and ﬁrms observed for one year only. The resulting
numbers of ﬁrms are reported, respectively by sector and year of observation, in Tables
2 and 3, which also show the percentage of exporting ﬁrms (i.e. ﬁrms that served foreign
markets in more than half of the period they were observed in the sample). Note that
the percentage of exporters is rather high due to the large size of the ﬁrms included in
the sample.
5 Benchmark speciﬁcation
Our aim is to investigate the relation between RMC spreads and openness to trade as
highlighted by Result 2 of the theoretical model in Section 2. Along the way, we will
also check the empirical relevance of Result 1.
10CADS was established in the early 1980s jointly by the Bank of Italy, the Italian Banking Association
(ABI) and a pool of leading banks with the aim of collecting and sharing information on borrowers.
11For a discussion about the representativeness of the sample, see Cingano and Schivardi (2004).
125.1 Estimating equation
Let us start by substituting the domestic cutoﬀ cost (9) in the interquartile range dis-
persion measure (13). The logarithmic transformation of the resulting equation gives
a downard sloping log-linear relation between RMC dispersion and trade openness Ω.
Although this structural relation is industry speciﬁc, limited degrees of freedom call for
some extra constraint on parameters. In particular, we assume that the ‘slopes’ are
the same across industries and rely on ﬁxed eﬀects (‘intercepts’) to account for industry
diﬀerences. Our empirical speciﬁcation then becomes:








with s = 1,...,17 t = 1983,...,1999
where, for sector s at time t, dispst is the (log) measure of RMC dispersion and omegast
is the (log) index of trade openness Ω. A vector Is of industry ﬁxed eﬀects, a vector It
of time ﬁxed eﬀects, and the disturbance term εd
st complete the speciﬁcation.
Three versions of (25) are presented. In Model [1] we run a simple bivariate regression
of dispst on omegast. This should not suﬀer from spurious time-series correlation as
neither productivity dispersion nor trade openness exhibit monotone trends (see Tables
8 and 10). In Model [2] we introduce sectoral ﬁxed eﬀects to control for time-invariant
industry characteristics that may impact on RMC dispersion. We also introduce year
ﬁxed eﬀects to control for speciﬁc events that may aﬀect the RMC distribution and
are common to all sectors. In 1992, for instance, the Italian economy underwent a
ﬁnancial and economic crisis that had a strong impact on all manufacturing economic
activities. In 1998-1999 some European countries, including Italy, moved to a ﬁxed
exchange regime with an impact on all industrial sectors.12 Finally, in Models [1] and
[2] the disturbance term εd
st is assumed to be iid. However, both dispst and omegast
result from estimation procedures, hence potential measurement errors stemming from
the corresponding regressions may lead to ineﬃcient coeﬃcient estimates. Industry and
year ﬁxed eﬀects should reduce the impact of of measurement errors on our estimates, yet
we cannot completely rule out that concern. For this reason, as suggested by Beck and
Katz (1995), in Model [3] we re-estimate (25) using the Prais-Winsten method with panel
corrected standard errors (PCSE) computed under the assumption of heteroskedastic
disturbances across industries.13
5.2 Productivity measure
For the estimation of individual productivity, we have adjusted both value added and
investment using the two-digit deﬂators provided by NIS’s National Accounts. The cap-
ital stock at ﬁrm level has been obtained from the book value of investment using the
12The implications of the theoretical framework have been derived under the assumption that factor
prices are equalized and technologies are the same across locations. Industry and time ﬁxed eﬀects
should also help to control for possible country asymmetries.
13Assuming PCSE is equivalent to assuming that disturbances are no longer iid. Alternatively, one
could use feasible generalized least squares. Beck and Katz (1995) show, however, that PCSE performs
much better when, as in our case, the time span is relatively small with respect to the size of the cross
section.
13permanent inventory method and accounting for the sector-speciﬁc depreciation rates
from NIS’s National Accounts data. The initial capital stock has been estimated using
the deﬂated book value, adjusted for the average age of capital calculated from the de-
preciation fund. Descriptive statistics for key variables for the estimation of productivity
are reported in Table 6.
TFP is estimated by the LPM procedure described in Section 3 using ‘intermediate
goods and services’ as the LP proxy variable. The output shares of capital and labour
are allowed to vary across sectors but not across years. Tables 7 and 8 respectively
report estimated average productivity by industry and by year together with various
average dispersion measures (the interquartile range ‘IQ Range’, the interdecile range
‘90-10 Range’, the Pareto skewness parameter ‘ks’).14 All dispersion measures reveal
sharp diﬀerences across industries. For instance, TFP dispersion in sector 1 (‘Food and
beverages’) is more than double the ones observed in sector 16 (‘Furniture’) and in sector
17 (‘Jewelery and related articles, Musical instruments, Sport goods, Toys and Games’).
Moreover, productivity dispersion shows no monotonic trend over time.
Tables 7 and 8 also report the decomposition of productivity growth following Pavcnik




where ηit is the share of ﬁrm i in sectoral output) is decomposed in two components:
an unweighted average productivity measure (ˆ a
LPM






t ), where ηt is average ﬁrm share in sectoral output). Accordingly, any
variation in the average weighted productivity of an industry can be decomposed in a
change in individual ﬁrm productivities for given output shares and in a reallocation of
output shares for given individual ﬁrm productivities. Columns 11-13 of Tables 7 and 8
report the results of this decomposition averaged across years and sectors respectively.
Weighted average productivity has grown at an average growth rate of 3 per cent a year,
with industry reallocations driving 13 per cent of the overall increase. There is, however,
a lot of variation across sectors and years. In particular, neither unweighted average
productivity nor its components seem to show clear monotonic trends.
The comparison of productivity dispersion across industries may be sensitive to out-
liers within sectors and to diﬀerences in the scale of operations between them. We deal
with the former issue by selecting the interquartile range as our benchmark measure of
dispersion and address the latter through industry ﬁxed eﬀects.
5.3 Openness measure
To calculate omegast based on (9), we implement









s with fD representing the domestic
ﬁxed cost averaged across time. For this we need the values of the elasticity of substitu-
14Tables 7 and 8 also show that the TFP and thus the RMC distributions can be reasonably approx-
imated by Pareto distributions. Formally, consider a random variable X (e.g., our TFP) with observed
cumulative distribution F(X). If the variable is distributed as a Pareto with shape parameter ks, then
the OLS estimate of the slope parameter in the regression of ln(1 − F(X)) on ln(X) plus a constant is
a consistent estimator of −ks and the corresponding R2 is close to one. For all sectors the R2 reported
under ks is far above 0.8.
14tion (σ), the shape parameter of the Pareto distribution (k), the ﬁxed cost ratio (T), as
well as the transport cost parameter (τ).
The elasticity of substitution is derived as a by-product of the LPM estimation pro-
cedure. It is calculated as the reciprocal of the estimated coeﬃcient of average deﬂated
sales in equation (22). Estimates for each sector are reported in Table 9. The values of
the estimated parameters, averaged across time, go from a minimum of 1.8 in sector 1
(‘Food, beverages and tobacco’) to a maximum of 5 in sector 7 (‘Petroleum and coal’).
Both the range of variation as well as the levels of this parameter look reasonable and
comparable with the values reported in the literature. In particular, our estimates seem
broadly in line with those in Broda and Weinstein (2006) who recover σ from the ex-
act price index of several CES aggregate goods. They perform their estimations at a
much ﬁner level of disaggregation, actually obtaining tens of thousands of elasticities.
However, at the SITC-3 level, which (though still ﬁner than ours) is the closest to our
disaggregation, they obtain a median value of 3.0, fairly in line with our own median
value of 3.23. Nevertheless, their sectoral distribution is slightly skewed towards higher
values when compared with ours (percentile 90: 7 against our 4.86; average: 5.9 against
our 3.37; percentile 10: 1.9 against our 2.26). This again could stem from the fact that
varieties should become increasingly substitutable as sectoral disaggregation gets ﬁner.15
The shape parameter, which is sector speciﬁc, can be estimated in various ways. In
our benchmark case, k is obtained by regressing the log of the rank of a ﬁrm within the
TFP distribution on the log of the individual ﬁrm TFP (see Helpman et al. 2003). As
reported in Tables 7 and 8, the goodness of ﬁt of this regression is reasonably high in all
sectors and years (R2 is never below 0.8), suggesting that the ex-ante TFP distribution
is fairly well approximated by a Pareto probability density function.
A proxy for the ratio of export to domestic ﬁxed costs T can be obtained as follows.
As suggested by Sutton (1991) and Syverson (2004), a measure of sunk entry costs in an
industry is provided by the capital to value-added ratio multiplied by the market share
of a median-sized ﬁrm. Since this can be seen as a measure of minimum eﬃcient scale
relative to the industry’s total market size, the resulting product represents a proxy for
the relative amount of capital required to achieve that scale. Since we are interested
in T = fX/fD, we calculate that proxy separately for ‘entrants in the export market’
and ‘non-exporters’, then take the ratio of the former to the latter. Since only ﬁrms
that start exporting in the current period and keep serving foreign markets for at least
one period are counted as ‘entrants’ into the export market, such ratio accounts for the
amount of ‘extra-capital’ needed in order to become an ‘exporter’.16 Moreover, fD is
made time-invariant by considering its average across years. This allows us to isolate the
eﬀect of diﬀerential ﬁxed cost growth for exporters with respect to domestic producers
in any given sector. All information needed is provided by the CADS dataset.
The measure of variable trade costs (τ) is obtained by estimating the gravity equation
implied by our theoretical framework. Formally, let EXPi = ˜ Pi ˜ Di denote the value of
15At face value, our estimates would seem also compatible with those in Hummels (2001) who infers
σ from the estimated parameter of the freight and tariﬀ variable in a trade equation. The two sets
of estimates, however, are not really consistent as the interpretation of the distance decay in trade
equations diﬀers between models with heterogeneous ﬁrms (our case) and models with representative
ﬁrms (his case). See footnote 17 for further details.
16As stated in Section 4, throughout the analysis ‘exporters’ are ﬁrms exporting for more than half
the years they are present in the sample.
15exports by a home ﬁrm i. Since only ﬁrms with RMC below the export cutoﬀ CX are
active in the foreign market, aggregate exports from the home to the foreign locations
equal EXP = NX
R CX
0
e Pi e DidG(Ci) where NX is the number of home exporters. Note
that EXP is positive provided that CX > 0, that is, there exists at least some home
ﬁrm i such that its foreign operating proﬁts ˜ pi ˜ Di/σ cover the ﬁxed export cost rαwβfX.



























is the industry CES RMC index. Hence, as in Chaney (2006) and Helpman et al.
(2007), (27) expresses aggregate bilateral exports as the product of parameters separately
describing the locations’ characteristics and an interaction term τ−k that captures the
dampening eﬀect of variable trade costs.17
Operationally, the measure of variable trade costs between locations is obtained by
assuming that τ depends on their bilateral distance as well as on the existence of common
border and language. In particular, the variable trade cost between Italy and its trade







where dh is the bilateral distance, Contigh is a dummy that equals one if Italy and
country h share a border, Langh is a dummy variable that equals one if they share a
common language. The parameters δst, νst and υst are estimated from the following
empirical implementation of (27) in log-linear form
ln(EXP
l,h
st ) = EXl + IMh − δst ln(dl,h) + νst Contigl,h + υst Langl,h + l,h (29)
where EXP
l,h
st denotes export from country l to country h, EXl and IMh are origin and
destination country ﬁxed eﬀects, and l,h is a random error. Fixed eﬀects pick up the
inﬂuences of exporting and importing country-speciﬁc characteristics. Among these, it
is worthwhile mentioning the remoteness of countries from their trading partners that
aﬀects bilateral trade ﬂows when our theoretical framework is applied to a multi-location
setup.18 The estimation is performed on a set of 100 countries (100 x 99 country pairs)
selected on the basis of the total sectoral trade ﬂow magnitude (exports + imports) over
the period 1983-1999. Therefore, the set of countries is the same across years and within
the same sector, but its composition may vary between sectors. Data on export ﬂows
come from the ‘NBER-United Nations Trade Data’ (Feenstra et al., 1997). Information
17In trade models with representative ﬁrms, the interaction term is τ1−σ instead of τ−k so that the
impact of variable trade costs on export ﬂows depends on the elasticity substitution rather than on the
skewness of the distribution of cost draws (see, e.g., Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003).
18For similar approaches to gravity regressions, see Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003), Head and
Mayer (2004), Redding and Venables (2004) in the case of representative ﬁrms as well as Chaney (2006),
Helpman et al. (2007) in the case of heterogeneous ﬁrms.
16on Contigl,h, Langl,h and dl,h comes from the ‘dist-cepii’ geographical dataset pro-
vided by the ‘Centre d’Etude Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales’ (CEPII).
In particular, we measure dl,h as the simple (geodesic) distance calculated according to
the great circle formula, which uses the latitudes and longitudes of the most important
cities/agglomerations (in terms of population), and account also for internal distances.19
In our benchmark speciﬁcation, the value of τst








st)−kst coming from (28).
A salient feature of the data is the high percentage of zeros in the bilateral trade ma-
trix, which exceeds 60 per cent of the observations for several sector-year combinations.
We deal with the resulting econometric issue following Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006).
Instead of the traditional log-linear version of (29), these authors estimate the model in
its multiplicative form and propose a pseudo-maximum likelihood estimation (PMLE)
technique, which has the additional advantage of addressing a serious heteroskedasticity
problem induced by the log transformation.20 Compared with the existing literature, our
estimated elasticities δst, which are reported by sector in Table 9 and by year in Table
10, take on reasonable values. Their (unweighted) average across industries is 0.7, which
is not very diﬀerent from the one obtained in other comparable studies.21 The ranking
of sectors according to the estimated elasticities shows below-average levels for industries
with high value added per unit-weight and for the so called ‘Made in Italy’ industries
(‘Jewelery and related articles, Musical instruments, Sport goods, Toys and Games’,
‘Electrical machinery and professional and scientiﬁc equipment’, ‘Transport equipment’,
‘Textiles’, ‘Leather and footwear’).
The computed values of omega are reported in Tables 9 and 10 by sector and by
year respectively. Interestingly enough, omega does not trend upwards monotonically
and several sub-periods are characterized by decreasing trade openness.
5.4 Results
The ﬁndings from our benchmark regression (25) are reported in the ﬁrst row of Table
11. The univariate regression (Model [1]) clearly indicates that cost dispersion and open-
ness to trade are negatively correlated across industries. The estimated parameters take
negative values and are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. These ﬁndings are conﬁrmed
by adding industry and year ﬁxed eﬀects (Model [2]) and are also robust to assuming
19Following Head and Mayer (2002, 2004), the internal distance of location l is calculated as
(2/3)
p
areal/π, which models the average distance between a producer and a consumer on a styl-
ized geography where all producers are centrally located and the consumers uniformly distributed across
a disk-shaped surface.
20For a diﬀerent methodology, see the two-stage estimation procedure proposed by Helpman et al.
(2007). The approach by Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) has the advantage of avoiding the complex
identiﬁcation issues involved in the two-stage estimation.
21Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) obtain a value of 0.77 in their preferred speciﬁcation, Helpman
et al. (2007) obtain 0.802. When using PMLE, Del Gatto et al. (2006) ﬁnd results that generate an
average elasticity for Italy equal 1.166. The fact that they consider a smaller sample of highly integrated
EU countries may explain the discrepancy.
17industry-heteroskedastic disturbances (Model [3]). As for the magnitude of the estimates,
a two-standard-deviation decline in openness to trade is associated with a 0.9 per cent
decrease of RMC dispersion, which is equivalent to a 7.6 per cent decline when evaluated
in terms of the standard deviation of the explanatory variable. We also test Result 1 of
the theoretical model, according to which more open sectors should exhibit lower values
of central tendency. Table 11 shows that Result 1 is indeed supported by the data.
The negative impact of trade openness on the central tendency of the cost distribution
is a common feature of the microeconometric trade literature. The negative impact on
the dispersion is new and it is partially at odds with Syverson (2004) who shows that
trade exposure has a positive (although not statistically signiﬁcant) eﬀect on productivity
dispersion.22 Our econometric results are, instead, largely consistent with those obtained
by Helpman et al. (2003) and Bernard et al. (2006). The former show that a proxy
for productivity dispersion is negatively correlated with the ratio of export sales to sales
through Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in the same industry. The latter ﬁnd that low
productivity plants are more likely to die in industries experiencing large trade costs
reductions.
6 Robustness checks
This section checks to what extent our benchmark results on trade and dispersion are
robust to various changes in the empirical speciﬁcation.
6.1 Endogeneity
Despite the presence of industry and year ﬁxed eﬀects, regression (25) might suﬀer from
problems of endogeneity and reverse causation.23 To deal with this issue, we have ﬁrst
used lagged values of openness instead of its contemporaneous values. In this unreported
analysis, the main ﬁndings are quite similar to our benchmark estimates. We have
then instrumented the degree of openness to trade using Turkey’s export share in world
trade. Just like Italy, Turkey tends to be a net exporter in traditional sectors such as
textiles and clothing, leather and footwear, etc. Thus, the ratio of Turkey’s exports to
worldwide trade ﬂows should be correlated with Italy’s openness to trade but reasonably
uncorrelated with the productivity of its ﬁrms. Data on trade ﬂows are drawn from
the NBER-United Nations Trade Data (Feenstra et al., 1997). Although the hypothesis
of inconsistent OLS estimates due to the presence of endogeneity can be rejected on
the basis of the Hausman test, we nonetheless report the results of the Instrumental
Variables analysis for all of our robustness checks. The corresponding estimates and
standard errors are shown in the fourth column (Model [4]) of Tables 12, 13 and 14,
together with other relevant statistics. These include the p-value of the F-test of the
excluded instruments in the ﬁrst stage regression, according to which Turkey’s export
share performs quite well as an instrument. Overall, the ﬁndings of the benchmark
speciﬁcation are conﬁrmed.
22See Section 7 for possible explanations of this discrepancy.
23This would be the case, for example, if the the political economy of trade policy depended on the
dispersion of ﬁrm performance (Bombardini, 2005).
186.2 Diﬀerent dispersion and openness measures
Our results might depend on the speciﬁc measures we selected for dispersion, central
tendency and trade openness. According to Tables 12, 13 and 14 that is not the case.
In particular, in Table 12 we consider three alternative measures of dispersion (90-10
Percentile Range, standard deviation, variance). Our benchmark results carry through.
In Tables 13 and 14 we consider alternative measures of variable and ﬁxed trade costs.
















st is Italian exports to country h and
P
h EXPh
st is total Italian exports.
Through (28), this leads to a second openness measure omega2. Second, in our bench-
mark speciﬁcation, we obtained a proxy for T = fX/fD dividing the ratio of capital to
value added for ‘entrants in the export market’ by the same ratio for ‘nonexporters’. In
order to focus on the eﬀects of the changes in fX, the ratio of capital to value added of
non-esporters was made time-invariant by taking its average across years. By foregoing
such averaging and implementing instead Tst = (fX)st/(fD)st, we get a third measure
of openness omega3.
Tables 13 and 14 show that the negative impacts of openness on dispersion and
central tendency survive. Table 14 also shows that measuring central tendency by the
mean rather than by the median does not make much diﬀerence.
6.3 Generalized speciﬁcation
So far we have heavily relied on the predictions of the theoretical model under the Pareto
assumption. In the wake of Syverson (2004), we now try to assess the relation between
RMC spreads and openness to trade within a more general framework. This is based on
the following speciﬁcation:
dispst = α + βopenst + γsigmas +
X
t
ιtIt + εst (32)
where disp is the dispersion measure and It denotes a vector of time ﬁxed eﬀects. Diﬀer-
ently from the benchmark case, having removed the Pareto assumption and the industry
ﬁxed eﬀects, we deal with the scale problem through standardized dispersion measures.
They include the IQ range divided by the median (‘St.IQ range’) and the 90-10 percentile
range divided by the median (‘St.90-10 percentile range’). The regressions based on the
former are presented in Tables 15 and 17, while those based on the latter are reported
in Tables 16 and 18.
In (32) sigma is the industry-speciﬁc elasticity of substitution obtained through the
LPM estimation procedure. It is included in the set of explanatory variables as Syverson
(2004) shows that product diﬀerentiation is an important driver of productivity disper-
sion. As to trade opennes open, we use three alternative measures. The ﬁrst is the
‘propensity to export’ (pexp), deﬁned as the average export-to-output ratio for our sam-
ple of ﬁrms. The second is the index of variable transport costs τ used to calculate omega
and it is thus an inverse measure of openness. Tables 15 and 16 list the regression results
19obtained with pexp and τ. They conﬁrm the negative relation between trade openness
and cost dispersion.
The third measure of openness is the export-to-output ratio computed from aggregate
data. It is meant to remove possible problems of representativeness and sample bias
aﬀecting pexp. Data come from the Italian NIS (Coeweb statistics on external trade).
These data also allow us to test the robustness of our results with respect to import
intensity, which cannot be recovered from CADS. Tables 17 and 18 report the regression
results obtained using for each industry the relevant ratio of: i) aggregate exports to
gross value added (AGGR-PEXP), ii) aggregate imports to gross value added (AGGR-
PIMP), iii) aggregate export-import ﬂows to gross value added (AGGR-PIMPEXP).
Benchmark results are again conﬁrmed. In line with Syverson (2004), all speciﬁcations
in Tables 15 to 18 also reveal a negative relation between product substitutability and
cost dispersion.
7 Conclusions
Whether and how trade openness aﬀects intra-industry ﬁrm heterogeneity may have
important implications for the political economy of trade liberalization. In this respect,
we have shown that a standard model with heterogeneous ﬁrms yields a key prediction:
more open industries should feature smaller dispersion of ﬁrm marginal costs. We have
shown that, when tested on Italian ﬁrm-level data, such prediction indeed ﬁnds empirical
support. This has been achieved by estimating individual marginal costs through an
innovative theory-based procedure due to Melitz (2000) that allows one to control not
only for the standard transmission bias identiﬁed in ﬁrm-level TFP regressions but also
for the omitted price bias due to imperfect competition.
Our ﬁndings are robust to alternative speciﬁcations and alternative measures of open-
ness and dispersion. They are, however, at odds with those in Syverson (2004) who
ﬁnds no signiﬁcant eﬀect of the propensity to export on productivity dispersion across
US industries. The diﬀerence might stem from the fact that he measures productivity
without correcting for the omitted price bias. His regressions, however, are based on a
cross-section of 443 disaggregated industries (compared to our 18 more aggregated ones).
This reduces the potential impact of the omitted price bias, which has been shown to be
a decreasing function of product diﬀerentiation. Alternatively, the diﬀerence might be
explained by the fact that he relies on a cross-section while we deal with a panel. More
simply, the diﬀerence might mirror the bigger relevance that external trade has for Italy
than for the US. As his and ours are the only existing studies that directly investigate
the impact of trade openness on cost dispersion and they yield conﬂicting results, there
is deﬁnitely a need for additional research on the topic.
20Tables and Figures
21Table 1: Sectoral disaggregation.
Code Short. Description
1 F Food beverages and tobacco
2 TC Textiles and Clothing
3 LF Leather products and Footwear
4 W Wood products except furniture
5 Pa Paper products
6 PP Printing and Publishing
7 PC Petroleum and Coal
8 Ch Chemicals
9 RP Rubber and Plastic
10 NM other Non-Metallic mineral products
11 Me Metallic products
12 FM Fabricated Metal products
13 Ma Machinery except electrical
14 EM Electrical Machinery and Professional and scientiﬁc equipment
15 Tr Transport equipment
16 Fu Furniture
17 JMST Jewellery and related articles; Musical instruments; Sport goods; Toys and games
18 Oth. Other manufacturing
2
2Table 2: Sample characteristics: number of ﬁrms by year.




















3Table 3: Sample characteristics: number of ﬁrms by sector.
SECTOR Total Percentage Total (%) Exporters (%)
F 845 23.8% 7.9% 5.0%
TC 1,446 44.1% 13.6% 15.9%
LF 493 49.1% 4.6% 6.0%
W 259 23.1% 2.4% 1.5%
Pa 316 28.5% 3.0% 2.3%
PP 271 15.7% 2.5% 1.1%
PC 25 21.7% 0.2% 0.1%
Ch 650 35.8% 6.1% 5.8%
RP 637 38.5% 6.0% 6.1%
NM 760 30.7% 7.2% 5.8%
Me 446 34.3% 4.2% 3.8%
FM 1,121 34.3% 10.5% 9.6%
Ma 1,561 48.5% 14.7% 18.9%
EM 894 39.3% 8.4% 8.8%
Tr 278 40.3% 2.6% 2.8%
Fu 475 37.5% 4.5% 4.5%
JMST 107 51.8% 1.0% 1.4%
Oth. 45 48.1% 0.4% 0.5%
Total 10,628 37.7 100 100
2
4Table 4: Sample characteristics: coverage 1991.
Class of workers:
SECTOR 1 2 3-5 6-9 10-15 16-19 20-49 50-99 100-199 200-249 250-499 500-999 1000- Total
F 0.02 0.15 0.37 2.09 8.04 10.88 18.04 26.02 36.29 53.66 41.18 42.86 63.16 4.09
TC 0.04 0.11 0.87 2.54 5.95 5.94 14.42 31.99 40.64 48.24 52.87 58.33 125.00 6.12
LF 0.08 0.15 1.77 5.41 6.75 7.23 14.14 32.82 38.41 47.62 50.00 14.29 100.00 8.00
W 0.04 0.00 0.29 2.94 7.43 11.15 19.17 45.06 66.67 25.00 57.14 100.00 - 3.47
Pa 0.00 2.22 1.22 4.28 12.36 13.61 28.13 52.50 55.41 41.67 68.18 63.64 66.67 16.18
PP 0.00 0.00 0.24 1.06 3.71 6.62 16.00 35.32 42.42 42.11 28.57 66.67 66.67 3.43
PC 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.90 17.86 5.80 28.57 0.00 50.00 - 62.50 50.00 6.40
Ch 0.00 0.95 2.60 8.81 15.96 18.18 38.11 52.65 45.64 43.33 47.31 71.43 62.79 19.17
RP 0.00 0.51 0.66 2.48 8.28 10.85 26.43 48.99 53.44 52.63 75.00 93.33 66.67 12.56
NM 0.00 0.48 1.51 2.81 7.97 11.92 22.88 42.21 50.76 62.07 66.04 79.17 85.71 10.20
Me 1.02 1.39 3.85 5.83 15.14 20.71 30.64 50.69 51.52 60.00 57.45 72.73 50.00 25.33
FM 0.00 0.00 0.69 1.24 4.95 5.96 18.20 37.17 42.46 67.44 49.23 44.44 0.00 6.15
Ma 0.10 0.36 1.13 3.38 9.69 10.68 25.21 49.00 56.08 45.00 52.26 71.43 69.70 13.49
EM 0.02 0.11 0.56 2.29 8.28 12.06 21.76 48.41 59.38 47.62 60.19 50.00 82.61 6.48
Tr 0.00 0.00 1.04 2.78 5.54 5.10 16.57 30.59 36.51 40.91 55.00 41.94 90.00 10.87
Fu 0.09 0.11 0.85 1.74 5.84 8.90 20.17 44.55 53.77 52.94 60.00 40.00 0.00 7.22
JMST 0.00 0.00 0.72 0.62 5.79 3.49 21.00 35.53 50.00 0.00 100.00 100.00 - 4.21
Oth. 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.91 2.40 10.64 13.38 25.58 28.57 0.00 40.00 0.00 - 2.44
Total 0.03 0.15 0.75 2.53 7.27 9.17 20.05 40.10 47.20 49.90 53.35 59.24 71.56 7.41
Source: ISTAT and CADS.
2
5Table 5: Sample characteristics: coverage 1996.
Class of workers:
SECTOR 1 2 3-5 6-9 10-15 16-19 20-49 50-99 100-199 200-249 250-499 500-999 1000- Total
F 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.60 4.13 8.80 19.87 42.86 42.98 50.94 49.23 51.72 87.50 5.20
TC 0.00 0.00 0.19 0.97 1.53 3.92 8.64 31.91 45.87 62.16 53.68 75.00 100.00 8.00
LF 0.00 0.00 - 0.67 2.59 2.29 8.24 34.89 48.46 66.67 68.18 12.50 100.00 7.41
W 0.00 0.00 0.00 - 3.05 1.86 8.63 36.62 52.08 25.00 50.00 100.00 - 5.43
Pa 0.00 0.00 - - 1.43 8.81 16.94 59.59 58.33 56.25 75.00 100.00 33.33 15.69
PP 0.00 0.00 - - 0.13 1.06 6.46 33.15 49.41 46.67 26.92 38.46 33.33 2.00
PC 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.13 3.33 18.75 23.53 18.18 100.00 40.00 33.33 - 6.51
Ch 0.00 0.00 0.65 2.25 3.72 7.34 26.43 54.39 52.54 61.76 54.43 60.87 66.67 16.86
RP 0.00 0.00 0.00 - 0.74 2.97 14.00 42.06 53.99 72.73 57.89 100.00 100.00 11.09
NM 0.00 0.16 0.19 0.67 0.97 2.49 11.35 35.17 52.76 52.78 79.59 76.19 60.00 6.78
Me 0.00 0.00 - 2.78 4.08 8.96 18.33 56.04 55.73 58.82 59.52 36.36 46.15 19.15
FM 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.53 0.22 0.87 6.03 38.90 50.34 55.81 64.06 66.67 0.00 5.07
Ma 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.48 0.31 1.82 10.25 43.41 53.31 47.87 58.90 65.00 54.55 10.49
EM 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.58 1.17 3.14 9.00 37.29 45.77 80.56 60.75 50.00 84.38 6.62
Tr 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.85 1.44 2.67 9.14 31.46 43.06 56.52 65.85 45.45 64.29 10.04
Fu - - - 0.11 0.23 0.91 8.83 47.85 56.38 56.25 59.26 80.00 0.00 9.04
JMST 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.67 0.41 0.90 12.66 34.92 56.00 50.00 66.67 200.00 - 4.28
Oth. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.52 0.00 5.34 28.57 31.03 0.00 40.00 0.00 100.00 2.01
Total 0.00 0.01 0.08 0.69 1.36 3.04 10.59 39.54 49.60 57.20 58.28 60.50 67.76 7.24
Source: ISTAT and CADS.
2
6Table 6: Descriptive statistics for key variables.
SECTOR TOTAL EXPORTERS
Value Added* Revenues* Exports* Capital* Employees Value Added* Revenues* Exports* Capital* Employees
All Sectors - 1991 4.918 16.521 2.407 11.000 107 6.832 14.928 22.621 6.183 148
of which:
F 6,066 27,094 1,242 14,552 112 10,843 28,641 44,968 5,758 192
TC 3,280 11,586 2,028 7,361 92 4,236 8,919 15,229 4,361 117
LF 1,916 8,470 2,391 2,696 55 2,268 3,341 9,814 4,355 65
W 1,870 6,987 404 5,181 49 2,787 7,642 9,983 1,793 75
Pa 5,282 17,648 1,827 15,960 99 10,179 31,414 32,612 6,369 179
PP 5,436 15,272 450 9,011 100 5,697 14,621 16,671 3,250 116
PC 34,269 157,659 2,164 138,286 474 24,223 33,553 85,364 9,379 366
Ch 9,516 36,435 4,001 24,327 169 14,351 42,028 54,352 11,190 260
RP 4,434 13,474 2,166 11,608 97 6,951 19,393 20,345 5,483 151
NM 4,305 11,434 1,397 15,297 93 4,969 15,056 13,432 4,470 114
Me 7,764 29,302 3,885 23,707 166 17,004 45,887 62,029 13,035 359
FM 2,543 7,876 1,052 5,457 60 3,576 7,938 10,934 3,010 81
Ma 4,463 14,351 3,822 7,359 106 5,671 9,249 18,736 7,430 133
EM 9,337 25,036 4,404 14,108 187 14,410 22,472 39,456 10,684 271
Tr 7,027 21,725 2,741 14,259 184 8,345 16,508 25,130 6,583 226
Fu 2,089 7,698 1,262 3,933 61 2,559 4,756 9,980 3,093 72
JMST 2,177 8,602 2,383 4,201 59 2,324 4,617 8,737 3,777 61
Oth. 2,137 6,601 1,070 4,296 61 2,167 4,812 6,070 2,016 67
All Sectors - 1983 4.680 15.034 1.419 15.782 150 6.892 24.285 22.100 4.058 224
All Sectors - 1999 8.669 33.922 13.393 18.988 155 12.573 27.671 48.104 19.064 217
Note: *Thousands of 1995 euros.
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7Table 7: Productivity and productivity dispersion by sector: LPM estimation.
Productivity IQ Range 90-10 Range ks Decomposition of Productivity Growth
(ˆ aLPM)
SECTOR Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. ¯ R2 Aggr. Pr. Unweighted Pr. Covariance
F 0.004 0.001 1.040 0.078 2.365 0.164 1.120 0.059 0.830 0.030 0.029 0.001
TC 0.518 0.067 0.832 0.047 1.883 0.158 1.466 0.059 0.876 0.022 0.017 0.006
LF 3.736 0.527 0.599 0.044 1.257 0.058 1.867 0.098 0.831 0.005 0.003 0.001
W 4.949 0.634 0.550 0.042 1.179 0.077 2.047 0.086 0.831 0.007 0.007 0.000
Pa 0.173 0.031 0.751 0.082 1.619 0.136 1.453 0.092 0.798 0.040 0.042 -0.002
PP 0.754 0.115 0.728 0.083 1.488 0.146 1.701 0.072 0.862 0.021 0.024 -0.003
PC 3.668 1.399 0.670 0.140 1.413 0.499 1.549 0.171 0.837 -0.007 0.006 -0.013
Ch 0.078 0.016 0.847 0.051 1.818 0.106 1.388 0.091 0.828 0.058 0.045 0.013
RP 0.458 0.053 0.612 0.032 1.359 0.047 1.787 0.078 0.840 0.016 0.012 0.004
NM 0.096 0.017 0.757 0.050 1.673 0.072 1.542 0.059 0.871 0.037 0.031 0.006
Me 0.197 0.042 0.665 0.044 1.480 0.122 1.694 0.088 0.856 0.062 0.045 0.017
FM 0.343 0.059 0.637 0.042 1.369 0.064 1.766 0.121 0.845 0.062 0.060 0.002
Ma 1.556 0.212 0.588 0.023 1.232 0.053 1.949 0.116 0.833 0.013 0.010 0.002
EM 0.639 0.137 0.691 0.038 1.492 0.056 1.688 0.101 0.848 0.050 0.050 0.000
Tr 0.706 0.091 0.636 0.049 1.387 0.112 1.788 0.113 0.851 0.006 0.006 0.000
Fu 2.294 0.280 0.492 0.040 1.051 0.060 2.145 0.145 0.844 0.008 0.005 0.004
JMST 3.244 0.464 0.552 0.062 1.316 0.156 1.944 0.097 0.911 0.004 0.002 0.002
Oth. 1.444 0.133 0.704 0.138 1.401 0.258 1.660 0.150 0.869 -0.027 -0.031 0.004
TOTAL 1.381 1.546 0.686 0.143 1.488 0.338 1.697 0.266 0.848 0.030 0.027 0.004
Note: Data are averaged across years.
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8Table 8: Productivity and productivity dispersion by year: LPM estimation.
Productivity IQ Range 90-10 Range ks Decomposition of Productivity Growth
(ˆ aLPM)
YEAR Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. ¯ R2 Aggr. Pr. Unweighted Pr. Covariance
1983 0.999 1.179 0.624 0.133 1.442 0.322 1.773 0.264 0.872 - - -
1984 1.026 1.183 0.652 0.138 1.543 0.487 1.756 0.276 0.865 0.077 0.053 0.023
1985 1.086 1.233 0.669 0.144 1.473 0.349 1.706 0.225 0.842 0.082 0.076 0.006
1986 1.174 1.273 0.680 0.149 1.474 0.377 1.750 0.257 0.849 0.095 0.097 -0.002
1987 1.218 1.292 0.689 0.150 1.481 0.291 1.718 0.275 0.845 0.087 0.068 0.020
1988 1.269 1.364 0.682 0.138 1.473 0.318 1.704 0.269 0.842 0.037 0.019 0.018
1989 1.292 1.399 0.675 0.117 1.424 0.256 1.714 0.278 0.832 0.035 0.036 -0.001
1990 1.352 1.464 0.680 0.124 1.437 0.317 1.667 0.265 0.827 0.056 0.049 0.007
1991 1.415 1.538 0.697 0.155 1.468 0.307 1.651 0.275 0.830 0.030 0.003 0.027
1992 1.505 1.673 0.709 0.133 1.502 0.295 1.598 0.234 0.821 0.019 0.041 -0.022
1993 1.515 1.662 0.733 0.158 1.540 0.370 1.565 0.244 0.823 0.017 0.022 -0.005
1994 1.654 1.857 0.688 0.140 1.568 0.294 1.623 0.232 0.848 0.040 0.042 -0.001
1995 1.684 1.962 0.703 0.156 1.553 0.396 1.693 0.273 0.872 -0.080 -0.055 -0.024
1996 1.603 1.857 0.690 0.149 1.473 0.340 1.754 0.284 0.867 -0.037 -0.025 -0.012
1997 1.557 1.764 0.670 0.142 1.460 0.348 1.766 0.288 0.868 -0.009 -0.026 0.017
1998 1.569 1.840 0.707 0.152 1.486 0.328 1.727 0.303 0.856 -0.043 -0.043 -0.001
1999 1.558 1.823 0.714 0.168 1.497 0.394 1.690 0.281 0.852 -0.017 -0.017 0.000
Total 1.381 1.546 0.686 0.143 1.488 0.338 1.697 0.266 0.848 0.030 0.027 0.004
Note: Data are averaged across industries.
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9Table 9: Descriptive statistics for regressors by sector.
OMEGA δs σs
SECTOR Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. Mean
F 1.781 0.275 -0.716 0.048 1.835
TC 2.807 1.400 -0.678 0.098 2.882
LF 5.592 2.895 -0.504 0.066 4.086
W 1.385 0.296 -0.903 0.059 4.367
Pa 1.182 0.074 -0.912 0.031 2.258
PP 9.396 2.270 -0.653 0.012 3.303
PC 1.018 0.015 -1.271 0.079 5.055
Ch 1.297 0.076 -0.813 0.021 2.391
RP 1.580 0.127 -0.734 0.019 3.165
NM 2.431 0.707 -0.624 0.048 2.969
Me 1.497 0.231 -0.785 0.055 2.913
FM 2.996 0.551 -0.681 0.022 2.552
Ma 2.868 0.487 -0.571 0.045 3.454
EM 6.774 2.194 -0.478 0.025 3.057
Tr 4.143 2.674 -0.595 0.080 3.995
Fu 4.227 6.808 -0.765 0.106 3.856
JMST 6.809 3.240 -0.430 0.054 4.857
Oth. 4.215 2.052 -0.588 0.083 3.624
TOTAL 3.489 3.185 -0.706 0.198 3.368
Note: Data are averaged across years.
3
0Table 10: Descriptive statistics for regressors by year.
OMEGA δs
YEAR Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev.
1983 3.762 3.365 -0.682 0.179
1984 3.585 2.470 -0.689 0.175
1985 4.106 4.951 -0.676 0.182
1986 4.516 5.191 -0.672 0.177
1987 4.104 3.737 -0.691 0.193
1988 4.515 3.501 -0.659 0.197
1989 4.670 3.930 -0.665 0.209
1990 4.238 3.200 -0.673 0.223
1991 3.020 2.450 -0.707 0.213
1992 3.251 3.001 -0.725 0.214
1993 3.000 2.605 -0.715 0.210
1994 2.579 1.646 -0.733 0.212
1995 2.876 2.640 -0.738 0.216
1996 2.846 2.416 -0.742 0.215
1997 2.923 2.803 -0.743 0.214
1998 2.510 1.676 -0.747 0.193
1999 2.818 2.157 -0.741 0.195
Total 3.489 3.185 -0.706 0.198
Note: Data are averaged across industries.
3
1Table 11: Benchmark results.
Dependent Variable Regressors and statistics Model [1] Model [2] Model [3]
RMC Dispersion omega -0.794*** -0.038*** -0.038**
(0.126) (0.014) (0.015)
N 279 279 279
R2 0.08 - -
RMC Central Tendency omega -0.719*** -0.024* -0.024***
(0.117) (0.012) (0.008)
N 279 279 279
R2 0.08 - -
Industry ﬁxed-eﬀects no yes yes
Time ﬁxed-eﬀects no yes yes
Notes: Key to speciﬁcations by column: [1] Univariate OLS regression; [2] Fixed-eﬀects
regression; [3] Prais-Winsten with panel corrected standard errors (PCSE) re-
gression. Robust standard errors (Model [1] and Model [2]) and panel-corrected
standard errors (Model [3]) in parenthesis.
Dispersion measure: IQ Range. Central tendency measure: median. All vari-
ables in logs.
* signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.
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2Table 12: Robustness checks: RMC regressions with diﬀerent dispersion measures.
Dependent Variable Regressors and statistics Model [1] Model [2] Model [3] Model [4]
IQ Range omega -0.794*** -0.038*** -0.038** -0.224***
(0.126) (0.014) (0.015) (0.080)
N 279 279 279 279
R2 0.08 - - -
F > 0 on excluded instr. - - - 0.000
90-10 Range omega -0.810*** -0.017 -0.017 -0.246***
(0.127) (0.016) (0.015) (0.075)
N 279 279 279 279
R2 0.08 - - -
F > 0 on excluded instr. - - - 0.000
Std.Dev. omega -0.803*** -0.030** -0.030** -0.249***
(0.127) (0.014) (0.013) (0.080)
N 279 279 279 279
R2 0.08 - - -
F > 0 on excluded instr. - - - 0.000
Variance omega -1.607*** -0.060** -0.060** -0.498***
(0.253) (0.027) (0.027) (0.161)
N 279 279 279 279
R2 0.08 - - -
F > 0 on excluded instr. - - - 0.000
Industry ﬁxed-eﬀects no yes yes yes
Time ﬁxed-eﬀects no yes yes yes
Notes: Key to speciﬁcations by column: [1] Univariate OLS regression; [2] Fixed-eﬀects regression; [3]
Prais-Winsten with panel corrected standard errors (PCSE) regression; [4] IV regression (instru-
mented: omega; instrument: export quote of Turkey). Robust standard errors (Model [1] and
Model [2]) and panel-corrected standard errors (Model [3] and Model [4]) in parenthesis. All
variables in logs. * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.
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3Table 13: Robustness checks: RMC dispersion regressions with diﬀerent measures of trade openness.
Dependent Variable Regressors and statistics Model [1] Model [2] Model [3] Model [4]
IQ Range omega2 -11.809*** -0.390** -0.390* -6.109**
(1.981) (0.169) (0.234) (2.520)
N 279 279 279 279
R2 0.05 - - -
F > 0 on excluded instr. - - - 0.049
IQ Range omega3 -0.763*** -0.037** -0.037*** -0.270***
(0.107) (0.015) (0.012) (0.080)
N 289 289 289 279
R2 0.11 - - -
F > 0 on excluded instr. - - - 0.000
Industry ﬁxed-eﬀects no yes yes yes
Time ﬁxed-eﬀects no yes yes yes
Notes: Key to speciﬁcations by column: [1] Univariate OLS regression; [2] Fixed-eﬀects regression; [3]
Prais-Winsten with panel corrected standard errors (PCSE) regression; [4] IV regression (instru-
mented: omega; instrument: export quote of Turkey). Robust standard errors (Model [1] and
Model [2]) and panel-corrected standard errors (Model [3] and Model [4]) in parenthesis. All
variables in logs. * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.
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4Table 14: Robustness checks: RMC central tendency regressions.
Dependent Variable Regressors and statistics Model [1] Model [2] Model [3] Model [4]
Median omega -0.719*** -0.024* -0.024*** -0.228***
(0.117) (0.012) (0.008) (0.064)
N 279 279 279 279
R2 0.08 - - -
F > 0 on excluded instr. - - - 0.000
Mean omega -0.732*** -0.017 -0.017** -0.225***
(0.118) (0.012) (0.008) (0.064)
N 279 279 279 279
R2 0.08 - - -
F > 0 on excluded instr. - - - 0.000
Median omega2 -10.778*** -0.214 -0.214* -6.140***
(1.832) (0.141) (0.111) (2.152)
N 279 279 279 279
R2 0.05 - - -
F > 0 on excluded instr. - - - 0.049
Median omega3 -0.690*** -0.030** -0.030** -0.259***
(0.100) (0.014) (0.012) (0.070)
N 289 289 289 289
R2 0.11 - - -
F > 0 on excluded instr. - - - 0.000
Industry ﬁxed-eﬀects no yes yes yes
Time ﬁxed-eﬀects no yes yes yes
Notes: Key to speciﬁcations by column: [1] Univariate OLS regression; [2] Fixed-eﬀects regression; [3]
Prais-Winsten with panel corrected standard errors (PCSE) regression; [4] IV regression (instru-
mented: omega; instrument: export quote of Turkey). Robust standard errors (Model [1] and
Model [2]) and panel-corrected standard errors (Model [3] and Model [4]) in parenthesis. All
variables in logs. * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.
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5Table 15: Robustness checks: Generalized speciﬁcation.
Dependent Variable Regressor and statistics Model [1] Model [2] Model [3]
IQ Range pexp -0.267*** -0.308*** -0.308***
(0.070) (0.079) (0.024)
σ -1.896*** -1.893*** -1.893***
(0.092) (0.094) (0.015)
N 289 289 289
R2 0.74 - -
IQ Range τ 0.438** 0.493** 0.493***
(0.206) (0.213) (0.053)
σ -1.915*** -1.914*** -1.914***
(0.095) (0.097) (0.018)
N 289 289 289
R2 0.73 - -
Industry ﬁxed-eﬀects no yes yes
Time ﬁxed-eﬀects no yes yes
Notes: Key to speciﬁcations by column: [1] Univariate OLS regression; [2] Fixed-eﬀects
regression; [3] Prais-Winsten with panel corrected standard errors (PCSE) regres-
sion; [4] IV regression (instrumented: omega; instrument: export quote of NAC).
Robust standard errors (Model [1] and Model [2]) and panel-corrected standard
errors (Model [3] and Model [4]) in parenthesis. All variables in logs.
* signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.
3
6Table 16: Robustness checks: Generalized speciﬁcation.
Dependent Variable Regressor and statistics Model [1] Model [2] Model [3]
90-10 Range pexp -0.271*** -0.299*** -0.299***
(0.072) (0.082) (0.025)
σ -1.912*** -1.909*** -1.909***
(0.094) (0.096) (0.016)
N 289 289 289
R2 0.74 - -
90-10 Range τ 0.449** 0.509** 0.509***
(0.208) (0.214) (0.060)
σ -1.931*** -1.930*** -1.930***
(0.097) (0.099) (0.017)
N 289 289 289
R2 0.73 - -
Industry ﬁxed-eﬀects no yes yes
Time ﬁxed-eﬀects no yes yes
Notes: Key to speciﬁcations by column: [1] Univariate OLS regression; [2] Fixed-eﬀects
regression; [3] Prais-Winsten with panel corrected standard errors (PCSE) regres-
sion; [4] IV regression (instrumented: omega; instrument: export quote of NAC).
Robust standard errors (Model [1] and Model [2]) and panel-corrected standard
errors (Model [3] and Model [4]) in parenthesis. All variables in logs.
* signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.
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7Table 17: Robustness checks: Generalized speciﬁcation.
Dependent Variable Regressor and statistics Model [1] Model [2] Model [3]
St.IQ Range AGGR-PEXP -572.685*** -488.323*** -231.532 -497.935*** -231.532* -497.935***
(188.411) (168.735) (201.623) (174.529) (136.615) (12.036)
σ - -49.728*** - -49.685*** - -49.685***
- (8.619) - (8.86) - (1.478)
N 128 128 128 128 128 128
R2 0.06 0.25 - - - -
St.IQ Range AGGR-PIMP -404.095* -773.537*** -261.403 -781.324*** -261.403*** -
(221.906) (195.717) (207.546) (201.770) (92.759) -
σ - -61.091*** - -61.184*** - -
- (8.68) - (8.925) - -
N 128 128 128 128 128 -
R2 0.02 0.29 - - - -
St.IQ Range AGGR-PIMPEXP -342.405*** -403.749*** -189.556 -410.416*** -189.556*** -410.416***
(118.066) (102.772) (126.465) (106.165) (69.528) (8.980)
σ - -54.905*** - -54.955*** - -54.955***
- (8.403) - (8.634) - (1.564)
N 128 128 128 128 128 128
R2 0.06 0.29 - - - -
Industry ﬁxed-eﬀects no no yes no yes no
Time ﬁxed-eﬀects no no yes yes yes yes
Notes: Key to speciﬁcations by column: [1] Univariate OLS regression; [2] Fixed-eﬀects regression; [3] Prais-Winsten with
panel corrected standard errors (PCSE) regression; [4] IV regression (instrumented: omega; instrument: export quote
of NAC). Robust standard errors (Model [1] and Model [2]) and panel-corrected standard errors (Model [3] and Model
[4]) in parenthesis. * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.
3
8Table 18: Robustness checks: Generalized speciﬁcation.
Dependent Variable Regressor and statistics Model [1] Model [2] Model [3]
St. 90-10 Percentile range AGGR-PEXP -1291.522*** -1101.856*** -135.652 -1116.801*** -135.652 -1116.801***
(423.977) (379.790) (369.603) (393.051) (303.131) (37.246)
σ - -111.801*** - -111.735*** - -111.735***
- (19.400) - (19.954) - (2.450)
N 128 128 128 128 128 128
R2 0.06 0.25 - - - -
St. 90-10 Percentile range AGGR-PIMP -912.239* -1743.241*** -6.567 -1753.278*** -6.567 -1753.278***
(499.383) (440.532) (381.189) (454.472) (205.748) (60.428)
σ - -137.415*** - -137.535*** - -137.535***
- (19.538) - (20.102) - (3.173)
N 128 128 128 128 128 128
R2 0.02 0.29 - - - -
St. 90-10 Percentile range AGGR-PIMPEXP -772.465*** -910.424*** -56.293 -920.748*** -56.293 -920.748***
(265.679) (231.309) (232.933) (239.135) (173.659) (28.080)
σ - -123.478*** - -123.555*** - -123.555***
- (18.913) - (19.448) - (2.694)
N 128 128 128 128 128 128
R2 0.06 0.29 - - - -
Industry ﬁxed-eﬀects no no yes no yes no
Time ﬁxed-eﬀects no no yes yes yes yes
Notes: Key to speciﬁcations by column: [1] Univariate OLS regression; [2] Fixed-eﬀects regression; [3] Prais-Winsten with
panel corrected standard errors (PCSE) regression; [4] IV regression (instrumented: omega; instrument: export quote
of NAC). Robust standard errors (Model [1] and Model [2]) and panel-corrected standard errors (Model [3] and Model
[4]) in parenthesis. * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.
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